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1 Introduction
The idea that the state alone has the right use or authorize the use-of-force is
one of its defining characteristics (Weber, 1946). For many citizens around the
world, police forces are the primary visible representation of the state’s monopoly
on violence. Yet, the legitimacy and public confidence in the police is under strain
worldwide especially in the wake of allegations of excessive use-of-force.1 Police
body-worn cameras (henceforth, BWC) have been hailed as a technological solu-
tion to increase scrutiny and oversight of the police. In this paper, we present
experimental evidence showing that police BWCs effectively work to de-escalate
police-citizen interactions, and improve the overall accuracy of police reporting.
We implemented a randomized controlled trial in a context that is more rep-
resentative of the challenges faced by police forces in the Global South: the state
of Santa Catarina in Brazil. Our experiment was designed to seed a random al-
location of body-worn cameras at the granular police dispatch – the relevant unit
of analysis in our study.2 We view such dispatch-level data as the “natural” unit
of analysis as it is the level at which citizen and police interactions unfold, and
use-of-force and its (de)escalation may occur.
We find that BWC trigger both notable improvements in the accuracy of police
reports and, in contrast with much of the existing literature, significant improve-
ments in interactions between citizens and the police and significant declines in the
use-of-force. For example, concerning reporting, dispatches treated with a camera
present were 9.2% more often referred to the main investigative body, and police
reports, on average, included 19.6% more victims. Importantly, treated dispatches
saw a decline in the likelihood of use-of-force by 61.2%. A negative interaction
index following Anderson (2008) – which also combines charges of contempt, dis-
obedience or citizen resistance, and use of handcuffs or arrests –, was reduced by
44.2%.
We further document that the treatment effects are primarily concentrated in
1See New York Times (2020), Confidence in police is at a record low, Gallup survey finds,
August 12, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-poll-police.html,
accessed 10.08.2021.
2Throughout the paper, we also interchangeably refer to a dispatch as a police ”event”.
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events that prior to police being dispatched were classified as relatively low risk by
virtue of there being either no weapons reported on the scene, there being no
injuries, nor there being any material risk of general unrest as judged by the police.
This suggests that cameras affect the situation dynamic by preventing the escalation
of tension that would counterfactually unfold in otherwise routine operations.
We next explore why cameras appear to work. In our design, both whether and
who carries a camera is random. This allows us to study whether who carries the
camera matters. We find evidence of stronger de-escalation effects and increased
compliance with the polices’ BWC standard operating procedures if the officer
wearing the camera is relatively junior. This suggests that BWCs might work by
empowering low-rank officers to monitor their higher-ranked peers, implying that
dynamic incentives and career concerns may be important factors driving their
effect. This peer monitoring effect goes beyond the usually suggested mechanisms
of BWCs reducing negative interactions due to the improved monitoring of both
citizen and police behavior that they enable.
Lastly, we also attempt to shed some light on why our results appear to stand
in contrast with much of the existing literature, which has mostly found null or
very muted effects of BWCs – in particular on use-of-force (see for example the
meta-analysis by Lum et al., 2020). Naturally, the differences could simply arise
because this paper is among the first to provide evidence of BWCs effectiveness in
the context of a lower-income country in which citizen and police relations may
structurally benefit more from BWCs (vis-a-vis the US and the UK which has been
almost exclusively the focus of the existing work).3 Yet, we show that a more likely
explanation for the failure of existing studies to identify effects is due to the re-
search designs and, in particular, the outcome measurement and empirical evalua-
tion strategies these studies adopt. In fact, our research design nests a broad class
of commonly used evaluation strategies or outcome measurement approaches that
have been employed across experimental BWC studies. This allows us to replicate
our own study at coarser levels of analysis or when employing different empirical
3Magaloni (2019) marks an exception studying a BWC randomized controlled trial in a neigh-
borhood of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Overall, they note very low compliance and little camera footage
being produced.
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strategies for evaluation. We find indeed that the estimated BWC treatment effects
are much more muted or disappear altogether when mimicking the coarser eval-
uation approaches commonly used in the literature. The exceptionally granular
data used in this study enables us to document that contamination, in addition to
the noise introduced in outcome measurement when moving from event-level to
coarser designs, in combination are the likely culprits.
This paper also contributes to the literature that studies mechanisms that can
prevent police misconduct (Shi, 2009; Rozema and Schanzenbach, 2019; Chas-
sang and Padró i Miquel, 2019). Harris et al. (2017) show that acquiring tactical
weapons has a positive effect on citizen-officer interactions, reducing both com-
plaints against officers and assaults on officers. Relatedly, Owens et al. (2018) in-
vestigates the effects of training on improving citizen-officer interactions. We also
contribute to the understanding of police interventions that aim to build trust or
improve citizen relations and reduce crime. The meta-study Blair et al. (2020) finds
no effects of community-policing intervention across different sites, including the
state of Santa Catarina, Brazil. Magaloni et al. (2015) and Ferraz et al. (2016) show
that another community policing program in Brazil known as UPP (Pacifying Police
Units) had a positive effect decreasing violence but in the very specific context of
territories dominated by drug trafficking gangs. Blattman et al. (2021) find little
evidence that increased police presence and improved services more generally re-
duce crime in aggregate. Bove and Gavrilova (2017) show that militarized policing
can deter street-level crime. Finally, we contribute to a broader debate on the pro-
ductivity effects of monitoring of actions, employer-employee agency problems,
and alignment of employees’ incentives to that of the general organization, for
which police officers are just one example. See Ornaghi (2019) on civil service re-
form and Bertrand et al. (2020) and Xu (2018) studying bureaucrats more broadly.
Relatedly, Battiston et al. (2021) shows how career incentives play an important
role in worker’s decision to communicate and their productivity. Our results sug-
gest that career incentives also play a role concerning the use of the body-worn
camera and how police officers work.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 provides the context, presents details about
the intervention and discusses the data and measurement approach. Section 3
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provides the main results. Section 4 concludes and discusses policy implications
of the experiment results.
2 Context, Intervention and Data
Brazil is one of the most violent countries in the world – in 2018, the homicide
rate was 27.4 homicides per 100 thousand inhabitants compared to 5.0 and 1.2 in
the US and the UK, respectively.4 We implemented the BWC intervention in the
state of Santa Catarina, Brazil. Santa Catarina exhibits a homicide rate that is three
times higher than the US and 12 times higher than the UK. We collaborated with
the Igarapé Institute and the Santa Catarina state Military Police (PMSC), the main
police body responsible for patrolling, responding to emergencies, and manning
the 911 hotline. It is the most visible element of the policing institutional infras-
tructure in Brazil. Five police precincts participated in the study: Florianópolis,
São José, Biguaçu, Tubarão and Jaraguá do Sul. Those sites were chosen to be
easily accessible from the police headquarters in Florianópolis and to represent a
variety of settings in terms of socio-demographic characteristics and of baseline
violence levels.5
Figure 1 provides an overview of the experimental design starting with the
project timeline in Panel A. Panel B illustrates the two layers of randomization
and how this induces variation at the dispatch level. Out of the roster of sworn
police officers per precinct we obtained in July 2018, we randomly selected 1/3
of the officers to be in the treatment group and 2/3 to the control group across
40 stratification blocks.6 Treated officers would always wear a camera if their 12-
hour shift falls on days that – due to our second layer of randomization – were
not selected to serve as blackout days. In every week during the twelve weeks of
the experiment, two days were randomly selected to serve as blackout days with
the randomization stratified by day of week providing us both within officer and
between shift experimental design. Control officers were mandated not to wear a
4See United Nations Crime Trends Survey, available at https://dataunodc.un.org/.
5A map of the experimental locations is provided in Appendix Figure A1, while Appendix
Table A1 studies site demographics.
6In total we have 150 officers assigned to wear BWCs and 300 control group officers. We
stratified by precinct, officer activity, rank, previous internal investigations, and gender.
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camera in any shift. Those two layers of randomization induce random allocation
of cameras to dispatches, our primary unit of analysis. We consider a dispatch as
treated if at least one officer tending to an event was wearing a camera. Since the
vast majority of dispatches involve more than one officer, this sparser one-in-three
officer-level randomization was chosen such that approximately half of the dis-
patches and events post-treatment would have a body-worn camera, maximizing
power and in sharp contrast with the existing literature which typically assigns
cameras to more than 50% of the officers participating – we will elaborate on this
in our discussion.7
Panel C of Figure 1 displays the number of dispatch events we observe by day
over the project period along with a moving average of the number of events
and the number of dispatches that had at least one officer present with a camera
present. Panel D provides the tabulation of the number of dispatches across the
two layers of randomization. Out of the population of events that did not occur on
blackout days – 13,264 dispatches – around 58% have had an officer present that
was wearing a camera in the respective shift in line with our simulations.
The integrity of the research design was protected due to a host of precautions.
Cameras and docking stations were kept in the armory of the police precincts that
officers visit at the start and end of each shift to collect and return their service
weapon and equipment. Further, the blackout days were randomly selected at the
start of the experiment but only communicated directly to the armory the evening
before to avoid potential selection around the blackout days. Further, dispatch
operators were blind to whether dispatch units are carrying a BWC. We find no
evidence suggesting that there was significant non-compliance or other issues that
could affect the integrity of the experiment which we discuss in the robustness
checks. We further describe the implementation details in Appendix A.
Throughout the implementation, the research team had strong backing from
the police leadership. Prior to the experiment, a series of standard operating pro-
cedures needed to be created or updated – particularly concerning data privacy.
The research team never had access to any recordings due to individuals’ privacy
7Appendix Figure A2 shows the result of the simulation which suggests around 50% of the
events would count as treated with the 1/3 to 2/3 allocation.
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concerns. The police also issued an updated standard operating protocol (SOP)
that mandated that every operation involving an interaction with a citizen should
be recorded, with few exceptions such as sensitive or covert operations. Police
officers were also required to inform citizens verbally that ”the dispatch was being
recorded, according to police protocol” whenever the situation allowed.
Data We primarily draw on three main data sources. The first is dispatch-level data
which is facilitated by PMSC fully digital data backend called PMSC mobile. The
data captures the universe of all dispatch events that were attended by any PMSC
officers. These events typically would originate from 911 calls, from self-initiated
calls due to routine operations (such as patrolling), or due to scheduled activities
(e.g. the execution of court orders). Our main outcome dataset contains a total
of 17,661 events that span over the experimental period ranging from September
3rd 2018 to December 10th 2018 (see Panel D in Figure 1). It includes information
regarding (i) timing of the event (call, dispatch, arrival at the scene and end of
the event); (ii) geographic information (the precise GPS location and full address);
(iii) event classification and reporting (dispatch opening and closing classifications,
internal prior risk assessment, the facts that were reported during the interaction,
and an indicator if the event generated a formal police report); (iv) use-of-force
(physical, non-lethal or lethal-force and number of victims, arrests and handcuffs
deployed) and (v) the hashed identifiers of officers that attended the event. We
can merge this data with the serial number of the camera that has been assigned
to treatment officers at the start of each shift.
In order to capture whether events are recorded, we merge the event informa-
tion along with the officer identifiers to the individual camera log files. These log
files along with the recordings cannot be tampered with. The information is ex-
tracted from the device in the armory after cameras are handed back at the end of
each shift for charging. The log files are subsequently transmitted to the research
team. As the log files provide both the serial number of the device and all infor-
mation on when and for how long the camera was activated, we can match this to
dispatch event information to capture whether recordings actually take place. This
level of data access and end-to-end measurement of compliance marks a significant
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improvement vis-a-vis the existing literature.
Further to the dispatch data, we observe a range of officer characteristics such
as their job title, rank, gender, the date of admission to the force along with the
number of internal investigations that have involved the specific officer.8 These
characteristics were also used to inform the stratification are subsequently used to
explore pre-registered heterogeneous effects.
We study two broad sets of outcomes in addition to measuring compliance di-
rectly: reporting and police-citizen interactions around a dispatch event. Reporting
is measured by (i) if the event generated generates a formal police report, usually
forwarded to the Civil Police which is responsible for investigative work prepar-
ing the formal judiciary charges and by (ii) if there was any victim, which is a
measure of diligence and discretion of police activity. For the interaction margins
we focus on (i) a measure of citizen behavior (if there was any filing of contempt,
disobedience or resistance charges towards police officers), (ii) if any use-of-force
was deployed (either physical, non-lethal or lethal, but excluding handcuffs and
arrests) and (iii) if there were any arrests or deployment of handcuffs. We fur-
ther create an inverse covariance-weighted index combining these three outcomes
following Anderson (2008), which we call Negative Interaction Index.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Main Specification and Results
In what follows, we use the following empirical specification




φoj(i) + εibdw (1)
where i indicates an event attended by a police dispatch, b is the police precinct,
d is the day and w is the week of intervention. The number of officers on the
event is n. For our main specifications, we consider that Treatedi = 1 if at least
one officer attending a dispatch was assigned to wear a camera. In this sense, our
8Such internal investigations could be the triggered by a formal complaints either from within
PMSC or from citizens.
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main specifications reflect intent-to-treat estimates. We include police precinct by
week fixed effects (ηbw) and number of officers fixed effects (nibdw). We also include
fixed effects for each of the stratification bins (∑nj=1 φoj(i)) along with day-of-the-
week fixed effects (τd). In our initial specifications, we exclude blackout days and
focus exclusively on comparing treated with control events. The disturbance εibdw
is clustered at the police precinct-by-day level.
Results We first document that dispatches treated by cameras produce notably
more camera recordings in column (1) of Panel A of Table 1. On average, 23.9%
of the treated events were recorded, and zero in the control group. The operat-
ing procedures for BWC usage required that cameras should only be activated if
there was any interaction with citizens, which does not happen in all dispatches.
Therefore, as expected, not all treated dispatches have an associated recording.
Importantly, we see no recordings in events attended exclusively by control group
officers.
We next study the impact of BWC on police reporting behavior across columns
(2) and (3). We find that, on average, dispatches treated with a BWC present are
reported 3.0 percentage points more often to the Civil Police, capturing a 9.2%
increase. We also find that share of events in which a victim is reported increases
significantly in the treatment group by 2.7 percentage points – capturing a 19.6%
relative increase. These results suggest that BWCs successfully affect officers’ re-
porting behavior. As we show in Appendix Table A2, we find evidence that of-
ficers’ description of the type of crime inflicted is also affected by camera usage.
Most notably, domestic violence cases are reported 67.5% more often when cam-
eras are present. We interpret these effects as ensuing from the accountability and
diligence of the police actions promoted by the camera.
We next study the treatment effects on citizen-officer interactions. The results
suggest that BWCs reduce the negative interaction index by 0.37 percentage points,
representing a decrease of 44.2%. Further, we find that filing of charges against cit-
izens, the use-of-force by the police, and the use of handcuffs or arrests decreased
substantially – respectively, by 28.5%, 61.2%, and 6.2% –, although only the ef-
fect on use-of-force is strongly statistically significant at conventional levels. The
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substantive decline in use-of-force marks a notable contrast with the existing liter-
ature that has typically found muted or no effects. We revisit this in the discussion
section.
Heterogeneity We explore heterogeneous effects in the subsequent panels of Ta-
ble 1. In Panel B, we study whether effects are primarily concentrated in events
that were classified ex-ante as low risk prior to dispatch. This assessment is done
prior to every dispatch by considering whether: (i) Are there people with life-
threatening injuries? (ii) Is the suspect still on site? (iii) Is the suspect carrying a
weapon? and (iv) Is there a risk of turmoil? An event is considered low-risk if
the response is negative to all these questions. The results suggest that the effects
of BWCs improving citizens and police interactions are fully driven by events that
are ex-ante classified as low risk. For those events, the negative interactions index
is reduced by 48.0%. No BWC effects are detected among events that are judged
to be high-risk ex-ante: the negative interaction index points to a much smaller
impact of 9.5% which is not statistically significant. This suggests that BWCs may
avoid escalation of situations. In high-risk events which have already escalated
prior to dispatch, the presence of a camera itself may not affect the situational dy-
namic. Taken together, those results suggest that cameras indeed serve as a way to
de-escalate conflicts, diffuse tensions, and ensure a better cooperative environment
on both sides.
In Panel C we find evidence that the treatment effects are larger with more cam-
eras on site. This suggests that the extensive and intensive margins of monitoring
matter. We find that dispatches with two or more cameras were recorded 7.8 per-
centage points more often (or a 34.8% increase), the likelihood of a police report
increases by 1.4 percentage points (51.6% increase), as well those reports tend to
include victims 1.6 percentage points more often (or a 66.3% increase). Those re-
porting effects are accompanied by a further reduction in the negative interaction
index – promoting a further drop of 25.4%. In particular, the use-of-force falls by
80.1%, which however is only significant at the 10% level.
Mechanisms We next show that the characteristics of the officer who is wearing
the camera appear to matter. In Panel A of Table 2, we explore treatment effects
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based on the rank of the officer assigned to hold the camera. We classify police of-
ficers into a low-ranked “soldier” category and a higher-ranked corporal or above.
We see that the BWC treatment effect is only present when an officer with a sol-
dier rank is holding a camera in the dispatch unit. Importantly, compliance with
the protocol appears to be notably lower when higher-ranking officers carry the
camera: dispatches appear to be recorded 22.8% less often compared to dispatches
in which junior officers are assigned to wear the camera.
Early career officers are more likely to show behavioral improvements and pro-
tocol compliance when in presence of a camera; this suggests that the reduction of
negative encounters between police officers and citizens is led by mostly changes
in police behavior rather than citizens changing their conduct when in presence of
a camera. These effects are consistent with career concerns being effective media-
tors of compliance and treatment effects.9
Blackout specifications We next investigate whether BWC effects would still be
present if officers in treated dispatches were not allowed to wear them. To do so,
we leverage on randomized blackout shifts, mimicking a shift-level experimental
design that is also commonly used in the literature. The added advantage is that
our design gives us treatment variation across shifts within officers, as explained in
Section 2. We estimate the following split-sample estimation equation:
yibdw = β1 × Treatedi × Treated Shiftd + β2 × Treatedi × Blackout Shiftd +




φoj(i) + εibdw (2)
where Blackoutd = 1 if day d was randomly selected as a blackout day and interact
all the fixed effects with the blackout day indicator. Thus β1 captures the treatment
effect within regular days (delivering the same point estimates as in Table 1 Panel
A) and β2 captures the effect of blackout days, which we would expect to be zero,
on average, in absence of learning effects.
9In Appendix Table A3 we compare the effects when dispatch units were composed of only
soldiers with at least one officer above the soldier level, irrespective of who, in the dispatch unit,
was actually wearing the camera. We show that, except for dispatch recording, the effect is not
driven by the dispatch unit rank.
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The results are presented in Table 3. Column (1) highlights that, on blackout
days, hardly any event gets recorded due to the experimentally induced absence
of cameras. We note that all BWC treatment effects on the outcomes measuring
citizen and police interactions disappear. Yet changes in the reporting behavior
persist. This could indicate that officers that were in the past exposed to the use
of cameras behave differently, even in the absence of the camera. This can be
consequential for alternative research designs as we discuss below. The learning
effects primarily affect the reporting margin but do not appear to have an effect on
use-of-force or other citizen-police interaction margins.
Robustness We conduct a few robustness checks that we further discuss in Ap-
pendix B. Specifically, results are robust to changes or refinements in the estimation
sample (see Appendix Table A4). Further, we do not see changes in the spatial dis-
tribution of treatment or control dispatches (see Figure A3). Appendix Table A5
further confirms that treatment status is not meaningfully correlated with location
or police response times. Lastly, we rule out that the results on low-risk events me-
chanically mirror the results on early career officers. This could occur if low-risk
events are assigned to junior officers. Appendix Table A6 shows this not to be the
case.
3.2 Situating findings vis-a-vis the existing BWC literature
Our results stand in significant contrast with much of the existing literature
which has often failed to detect effects of BWCs on use-of-force.10 Different find-
ings could naturally have arisen due to the different settings in which the experi-
ments were conducted. For instance, our study is the first to evaluate the effects of
body-worn cameras in a middle-income, high-crime setting (compared to existing
studies which are mostly conducted in the UK or the US). While we cannot rule
out that context-specific effects may have played a role in explaining the differ-
ences in the estimated BWC effect, we provide evidence consistent with the view
that the previous studies were plagued by methodological issues that resulted in
a muted evaluation of BWCs effects.
We can make progress in this direction by replicating in our data the evaluation
10See Appendix Table A7 for an overview of the literature.
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designs used in most past studies. This is feasible as our study directly nests
shift- and officer-centric research designs.11 Doing so uncovers BWC effects that
are similar to past studies; this naturally suggests that the BWC literature null can
be due to the empirical design rather than the absence of true effects. We argue
that such collection of results is consistent with contamination attenuating effects
estimated at coarser levels of analysis.
We also investigate how the data aggregation might have affected the BWC
effect estimates. Unsurprisingly, we find that more disaggregated data – as used
in this study –, provide for increased precision by increasing sample sizes and
enabling detailed controls, e.g. fixed effects at very fine levels. In other words,
these findings are consistent with the interpretation that past studies that make
use of aggregate data may suffer from power issues. We finally compare two
leading estimation strategies – differences-in-means and differences-in-differences
typically used in spatially explicit designs –, and suggest that both can recover
relatively similar BWC effects.
We next describe these exercises, and Appendix C provides the econometric
details that underpin those analyses.
Unit of randomization and analysis We first contrast the results from our design
at the event-level with what we would obtain if we were to reanalyze the data at the
officer or shift levels, reproducing the level of variation of several past studies.12
This allows us to investigate the extent to which the BWC camera effect estimates
are sensitive to the experimental design.
The estimate in Panel A of Figure 2, labeled as ”event” and in red, shows the
point estimate and the 90% confidence interval. This is our estimated event-level
BWC effect which delivers a reduction in use-of-force of 61%. We next aggregate
the outcome data at the officer-by-day level. The dependent variable is the share
of events that had use of force during a given day in which cameras were used for
a given officer.
11Appendix Table A7 overviews the main features of 31 papers that investigate the effects
of body-worn cameras. We classify the studies as shift-centric (7 papers), officer-centric (13) or
spatially-explicit designs (11).
12Panel A of Table A7 lists seven papers with shift-centric designs. Panel B lists 13 papers that
make use of officer-level allocation.
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This specification only explored variation between treated and control group
officers. The share of events attended by officers assigned to wear a BWC see a
decline in use-of-force by 33%. This effect is roughly half the effect that was esti-
mated in the event-level data. The attenuation is not surprising: in our design 1/3
of officers were randomly selected to wear a camera, resulting in around 50% of
the events being treated with at least one camera present due to the of dispatches.
At the coarser officer-level, since a noticeable share of events attended by control
group officers are indirectly treated, this leads us to underestimate the true treat-
ment effect by around 50%. Such contamination-induced attenuation bias may
affect existing studies conducted at the officer-level as many contexts involve rou-
tinely dispatching officers in teams. What is even more problematic is that almost
all existing studies cannot directly test or measure contamination due to a lack of
detailed event-level data.13
Further, the extent of contamination-induced attenuation bias is likely increas-
ing in the share of officers that wear a camera. Virtually all officer-centric studies
opted for a design with 50% of officers assigned to wear a BWC. Assuming a sim-
ilar dispatch composition as in our context, this implies that 75% of all events are
treated with at least one camera (see Appendix Figure A2), undermining power
and downward-biasing the treatment effect estimate when studying the officer-
level data. As a result, we would expect that to only estimate an effect-size that is
25% of the event-level design at the officer level – implying that we would estimate
that use-of-force only declines by 15% (vis-a-vis the actual much larger decline of
60%).
Lastly, we can also speak to the shift-level design due to the blackout versus
non-blackout days in our design. Seven studies opted for such a design; the figure
indicates the point estimate from one such study (see Ariel et al., 2016b). Similar
to that study, we find a statistically insignificant negative effect on use-of-force of
about 9.5%. There are two likely explanations for this result. First, learning effects
of camera use have the potential to alter officer behavior in control shifts. This is
13Of the 12 studies that opted for an officer-based design, we identified whether officers are
dispatched in teams for only six studies – out of those, 50% report that officers are dispatched in
pairs or more officers. These studies may thus be vulnerable to such attenuation bias.
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indeed documented in Table 3 in our own setting. Second, the loss of precision
can be associated with power issues from a reduced sample size: it appears that
for shift-designs to be able to detect effects, samples need to be much larger and
the treatment may need to be much higher powered.
Temporal resolution of outcome measurement We document that accounting
for unobserved time-effects may be very important. Holding all other aspects
constant, we focus on the officer-level variation studying outcomes either at officer-
by-day, officer-by-month, or pooled levels. Specifications at coarser levels may
introduce a broad range of biases as it implies that we can not control for the
potential confounding effect of time fixed effects which are likely very relevant.
In Panel B of Figure 2 documents what happens to our point estimates with
various data aggregations. We move to the officer-by-month data cuts and detect
use-of-force estimate of around 30.8%, which is comparable to the estimated effect
of 33% in the officer-day level. We only reject the null hypothesis in the officer-
by-day data cut, highlighting that controlling for unobservable time factors do not
immediately appear to affect the point estimates but may decrease power.
We lastly document our point estimates when conducting inference by com-
puting differences-in-means between treated and control group officers with the
data resolution at the pooled officer level. The outcome variable is the share of
incidences in which force was used for each officer throughout the experimental
period. We find a reduction in use-of-force by around 14.3% and not statistically
significant, which is more than a four-fold decrease from the event-level estimates.
We illustrate the null-effect point estimate of Yokum et al. (2019), which is an ex-
ample of a pooled officer-level study, which lies well within the confidence interval
of our estimate that is obtained when replicating such a pooled design. The fail-
ure to account for potentially confounding time-effects both appears to widen the
confidence bands and implies a further attenuation of the estimated effect.
Inference method Lastly, our design also allows us to speak to different causal
inference methods. The most common alternative design is difference-in-differences
used across eight studies. At the officer-level, this may tackle the attenuation issue
that gets introduced by the fact that many officers may attend events together re-
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sulting in control group officers being treated indirectly. In Panel C of Figure 2, we
document the point estimates that emerge when we use between-officer difference
in means estimate and a simple difference-in-difference design. The point esti-
mate of the pooled difference-in-means at the officer level is the same as the third
estimate in panel B; moving to the difference-in-differences, we again uncover a
negative treatment effect estimate. However, this is still smaller compared to the
point estimate at the event-level. Yet, it does suggest that difference-in-differences
in general, while still underestimating the treatment effect and being rather impre-
cise, it comes closer to the event-level results. As indicated, this is not surprising
as we implicitly control for some common time effects and also are controlling
for some time-invariant confounders, helping precision. We illustrate the point
estimate from Braga et al. (2018) as an existing study that opted for such a design.
Our combined conclusion from these exercises is that many existing studies
may systematically underestimate the treatment effects. This may explain why the
literature has, to date, not systematically shown that BWCs are effective devices in
curbing police use-of-force. We now conclude the paper.
4 Conclusion
Police violence is a worldwide concern and there is an urgent need to find ways
to increase accountability. In this paper, we investigate the effects of body-worn
cameras on police officer reporting behavior, on citizen misbehavior, on use-of-
force, and on use of handcuff and arrests. Through a large-scale experiment with
an original design, we show evidence that body-worn cameras are effective to
reduce use-of-force by police officers. The experiment took place in the state of
Santa Catarina, Brazil, and five precincts were part of it with approximately 450
police officers taking part.
The results show that body-worn cameras are effective to improve the nature
of police-citizen interaction – much to the contrast of the existing literature. Body
worn cameras reduce use-of-force by the police by around 61.2% and improve the
reporting accuracy of police officers. Moreover, we show that the decrease in use-
of-force takes place in low seriousness events, as judged by a previous measure
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of risk assessment. The dispatch composition and the characteristics of the officer
who is wearing the camera also matter for the treatment effect. Officers early in
their careers, with a soldier rank, present higher reductions on the negative inter-
action index and on the filing of charges against citizens when carrying cameras.
The experiment has important policy implications. First, the results suggest that
cameras are effective to curb police violence, which suggests that using them can
increase the accountability of police officers. Moreover, the officer who wears the
camera is also an important feature for compliance and for the results regarding
use-of-force to exist. Officers early in their career and with no previous investi-
gations are more likely to comply with the protocol and show improvements in
reporting and interaction margins metrics. Implementing cameras can be an im-
portant step towards decreasing excessive use-of-force by the police, but to ensure
that the cameras are efficient, it is important to consider the career incentives that
exist for police officers that wear cameras. If officers are concerned about career
progression, they are more likely to adjust their conduct to the protocol, fearing
the possible repercussions. Put together with the results on blackout days, which
show that treated officers in blackout days do not show a reduced use-of-force, the
effects indicate that wearing a camera is important for inducing behavioral changes
even for officers with career incentives, which are driving most of the treatment
effect. Therefore, cameras are effective if police officers are concerned about the
career implications of misbehaving.
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Figure 1: Timeline and experimental design
Randomization 
of officers
Experimental period ~ 3 months
with random blackout days
Panel A : Timeline of experiment
Panel C : Number of events over time and share of treated events
Equipment installation,
& officer training
# of events Average (7 day) of # of treated eventsAverage (7 day) of # of events
Panel D : Tabulation of # events by implied treatment status
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Regular (5/7) Blackout (2/7)
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Panel B : Experimental design  
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2/3 officers w/o cameras
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Officer composition attending an event 
Between officer Treatment across events on a specific dayBetween shifts
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Notes: The figure presents the experimental design. Panel A provides the timeline of the experiment that was conducted in 2018. Panel B illustrates the between- and within
officer variation that is randomly induced and how this can map into different treatment status at the individual event level. Panel C plots the time series of the number of
events with a police dispatch per day across the experiment along with the seven day moving average of the number of treated- and overall number of events illustrating that,
on average, 50% of events haven an officer attending that is assigned to wear a camera. Panel D presents the tabulation of the overall number of experimental events by the
treatment status.
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Figure 2: Comparing the distribution of effects with different designs and the literature
Event−level estimates























B. Varying temporal resolution







C. Varying inference method
Notes: The figure presents results on how the estimated treatment-effect sizes vary if we reanalyze the data using different commonly used evaluation strategies. Panel
A explores how changing the unit of randomization affects the results. Benchmark results from this paper exploit event-level variation and are presented in red. More
commonly used designs exploit only experimental variation between treated- and control group police officers or shifts. Estimates of effect sizes from reference studies in the
literature using such designs are annotated as a horizontal dashed line. Panel B explores varying the temporal resolution of the outcome data focusing on the officer-level.
Panel C explores different inference approaches commonly used.
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Table 1: Effects of body worn cameras on accuracy of police reporting and
citizen-police interactions






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Main Effect
Treat 23.883*** 3.018*** 2.717*** -0.374*** -0.266 -0.426*** -0.338
(1.110) (1.014) (0.661) (0.142) (0.187) (0.156) (0.464)
Panel B. Heterogeneity by ex-ante Event Risk Assessment
T x Low Risk 23.868*** 2.818*** 2.288*** -0.406*** -0.383* -0.415*** -0.456
(1.119) (1.061) (0.683) (0.143) (0.196) (0.150) (0.487)
T x High Risk 24.011*** 5.114* 6.903*** -0.080 0.767 -0.503 0.732
(1.880) (2.651) (2.273) (0.640) (0.802) (0.698) (1.507)
Coef. Difference -0.142 -2.295 -4.614** -0.325 -1.150* 0.087 -1.188
(1.659) (2.789) (2.386) (0.661) (0.843) (0.706) (1.580)
[0.4659] [0.2060] [0.0276] [0.3116] [0.0873] [0.4508] [0.2268]
Panel C. Treatment Intensity
T - 1 Camera 22.320*** 2.734** 2.397*** -0.331** -0.210 -0.393*** -0.122
(1.131) (1.080) (0.687) (0.135) (0.192) (0.145) (0.495)
T - 2 or More Cameras 30.082*** 4.145*** 3.986*** -0.546** -0.489 -0.558* -1.194
(1.864) (1.527) (1.109) (0.276) (0.352) (0.295) (0.768)
Coef. Difference -7.762*** -1.411 -1.589* 0.215 0.278 0.165 1.072*
(1.674) (1.530) (1.088) (0.246) (0.349) (0.252) (0.791)
[0.0000] [0.1790] [0.0733] [0.1922] [0.2135] [0.2571] [0.0888]
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 0.934 0.696 5.420
N 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264
Notes: Table presents results on the impact of a body worn camera being present at a police event. Panel A presents the main results
capturing the average intent-to-treat effect. Panel B explores heterogeneity by the ex-ante risk level of the events, which characterizes an
event as low risk if it has no weapons on the scene, if there are no injuries, if the suspect is not on site and if there is no material risk of
general unrest.Panel C investigates treatment intensity heterogeneity, given by the number of officers wearing a camera in events. The
dependent variables are “Dispatch recorded” indicating that the dispatch was partially or fully recorded using the body worn camera
and hence represents the treatment being delivered. “Police Report” and “Victims in report” capture the extent to which officers
formally report events, on which basis the Civil Police would proceed investigations. Interaction Margins comprises: (i) “Negative
Interaction Index” is the standardized inverse-covariance weighted average of the three indicators in the group; (ii) “Contempt, Resist
and/or Disobey ” is an indicator if charges of contempt, disobedience or resistance towards the police were registered; (iii) “use-of-
force ” is an indicator if there was any deployment of physical, non-lethal (mechanical) or lethal force by the police, not considering
use of handcuff or arrest; (iv) “Handcuff and/or Arrest”is an indicator if handcuffs were used or if any arrests made. All dependent
variables are multiplied by 100. Specifications include police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of officers and stratification
bins fixed effects. Shifts without camera are excluded from the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct-by-day level.
*** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table 2: Who holds the camera matters: Effects of body worn cameras on
accuracy of police reporting and citizen-police interactions






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Rank
Treated by Officer(s) with Soldier rank 24.743*** 2.645** 2.835*** -0.444*** -0.377* -0.476*** -0.463
(1.187) (1.085) (0.721) (0.152) (0.207) (0.162) (0.468)
Treated by Officer(s) with higher than Soldier rank 19.112*** 3.797* 2.492* -0.187 0.033 -0.295 -0.036
(1.987) (1.953) (1.377) (0.235) (0.337) (0.254) (1.002)
Treated by Officers of both types 24.593*** 6.392** 1.597 0.144 0.536 -0.055 0.675
(2.268) (2.615) (1.670) (0.500) (0.700) (0.515) (1.549)
Panel B. Any Previous Disciplinary Procedures
Treated by Officer(s) with 0 Disciplinary Procedures 25.336*** 1.809 1.903** -0.414** -0.306 -0.457** -0.812
(1.314) (1.235) (0.862) (0.176) (0.260) (0.178) (0.585)
Treated by Officer(s) with at least 1 Disciplinary Procedure 19.842*** 4.658*** 3.597*** -0.328* -0.167 -0.421** 0.386
(1.437) (1.246) (0.905) (0.170) (0.246) (0.186) (0.684)
Treated by Officers of both types 35.007*** 2.681 3.649** -0.341 -0.513 -0.246 -0.895
(2.554) (2.091) (1.540) (0.402) (0.511) (0.428) (1.103)
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 0.934 0.696 5.420
N 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264
Notes: Panel A explores rank heterogeneity of who is wearing the camera. Soldier is the lowest rank in the Military Police. Disciplinary procedures are measured as
if the officer has any Inquérito Policial Militar, Procedimento Administrativo Disciplinar and Sindicância Administrative investigations results from formal complaints over
officer behavior, generated either internally or externally. Dependent variables defined as in Table 1. Specifications include police precinct-by-week, day of the week,
number of officers and stratification bins fixed effects. Shifts without camera are excluded from the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct-by-day
level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
24
Table 3: Exploiting within-shift variation: Effects of body worn cameras on
accuracy of police reporting and citizen-police interactions






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated in Treated Shifts 23.883*** 3.018*** 2.717*** -0.374*** -0.266 -0.426*** -0.338
(1.112) (1.015) (0.662) (0.142) (0.187) (0.156) (0.465)
Treated in Control Shifts 3.780*** 3.541** 0.717 0.041 0.001 0.058 0.146
(0.886) (1.684) (1.252) (0.185) (0.304) (0.209) (0.695)
Mean Dep. Var Control in Treated Shifts 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 0.934 0.696 5.420
Mean Dep. Var Control in Control Shifts 0.000 34.266 17.190 0.681 0.800 0.514 5.425
N 17661 17661 17661 17661 17661 17661 17661
Notes: Table documents within-shift comparison between events that had a police officer assigned to wear cameras and control ones across
randomly assigned shifts in which treatment officers were handled cameras (Treated Shifts) and the ones in which they were not (Blackout or
Control Shifts). Dependent variables defined as in Table 1. Specifications include police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of officers
and stratification bins fixed effects. All fixed effects are interacted with a Treatment Shift indicator for within-shift estimation. Standard errors
are clustered at the precinct-by-day level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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The project timeline considered that officers selected to wear the camera would
have to go through special training and have their uniforms adapted to hold the
camera com fortably and effectively. For these reasons, the randomization alloca-
tion was assigned in 27/07/2018, about a month before the experiment started,
but was not communicated to the officers until closer to the experiment date. All
tests with the cameras and docking stations were conducted during this period
to ensure that the information necessary for the experiment was correct and to
minimize technical issues during the experiment period.
Shift-level treatment allocation was randomized before the start of the experi-
ment, but we only communicated to the police precincts in the preceding evening
through dedicated WhatsApp groups established for this purpose. This was sup-
posed to avoid the potential for the endogenous selection of any aspect of the
policing activity with respect to the anticipation of blackout days to begin with.
Importantly, the blackout applies to officers starting their shifts. That is, officers al-
ready out for their regular patrol activities at midnight of the start of the blackout
would continue to use their cameras until the end of their shift; conversely, any
shift that starts during blackout that spans after its end would not be recorded.
This feature was necessary for logistic reasons: the police deemed it not practical
or desirable to interfere in the apparatus of the dispatch units after they had left
the precinct headquarters.
Intervention step-by-step Once the experiment period started, the intervention
would happen as follows. At the start of their shifts, treated officers would obtain
their camera, along with other equipment, from the armory section of the police
precincts – from where they obtained their gun, radio, and other equipment of
regular and irregular use. The armory sections are usually very secluded and con-
sidered to be of high-security environment – due to the nature of the material that
is stored therein – and only a few high-ranked officers have access to those rooms.
Importantly, the docking stations, which both downloaded the videos at the end
of every shift and recharged the cameras, were located in the armory rooms. This
ensured that not only the equipment was maintained, regularly inspected, and
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kept to a good working order throughout the experiment and ensured that dock-
ing stations and cameras themselves were not interfered with or violated during
the experiment.
The docking stations were remotely accessible from the PMSC headquarters.
Videos were stored locally for 30 days and pulled to the central HQ on demand
due to bandwidth issues. The research team established routines to consolidate the
camera automatic logs in a central database. In this way, it is possible to observe if
a given dispatch generated a video recording, as well as the corresponding docking
station and filenames. After finishing their shift, police officers would hand back
cameras to the armory section, docked in the station, and readied for the next use.
This recycling process usually took between 4 and 6 hours for a full battery charge
that lasted at least eight hours in continuous regular use.
On the preceding night before control shifts, the research team would message
the officers responsible for the armory sections in each police precinct telling them
to not give cameras to treated officers. So all the officers that would start their
shifts in the blackout day would receive from the armors all the equipment but the
cameras. Figure 1 Panel B provides a clear visual exposition of our experimental
design: on any given day, dispatch units would be composed by on average two
officers. If any of those was assigned to wear a camera at the officer level ran-
domization (red-colored officers), this dispatch (as well as the event they tended
to) is classified as a treatment one. Thus, the average treatment effect of BWC
implementation over police activity and police-citizen interactions is identified by
comparing events attended by dispatches with at least one officer assigned to wear
a camera with events with none.
As for blackout shifts, Figure 1 Panel B shows that in the green days (blackout),
all treated (red) officers would not be allowed to wear cameras. Therefore, we
can compare events attended by treated dispatches with events attended by con-
trol dispatches in days in which no treatment officer is allowed to wear cameras,
allowing us to identify if the effects would persist were the treatment technology
not present. Importantly, the dispatch operators were blind to whether dispatch
units were manned with officers wearing a body-worn camera. This prevented
the endogenous allocation of dispatch calls to be recorded (or, conversely, to avoid
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recoding). Panel C of Figure 1 presents the overall time series of events that occur
in the study period and around it. The solid lines refer to the seven day moving
average of the number of events (black) and the number of events attended by at
least one officer wearing a camera (red), highlighting that as per our initial design
this leaves around 57% of the events attended by some officers that are assigned to
wear a camera. Panel D of Figure 1 provides the exact tabulation of the numbers
of events that occur by their respective treatment status.
B Robustness Checks
To address potential concerns that would threaten the validity of our findings,
we add some robustness checks. In Appendix Figure A3, we show a heat map
with the geographic location of dispatches by treatment status. Results show that
the spatial distribution of treatment and control dispatches is virtually the same,
which suggests that there is no selection in space, reinforcing that treated and
control dispatches attend events in similar areas of the city. One could argue
that police officers with cameras would change their patrolling behavior and law-
enforcement activity in order to avoid interacting with citizens. Therefore the
observed decrease in the interaction margins would be attributable to a change in
the type of events they attend to rather than cameras improving dispatch officers’
behavior when present. Appendix Figure A3 shows we have no reason to believe
that this is driving the estimated treatment effects. We further confirm this in
Appendix Table A5 where we run the time-to-response, latitude, and longitude on
the treatment status. We find that the treatment and control respond in similar
times and are, on average, in the same geographical coordinates.1
Appendix Table A4 shows that the main results are robust to changes in the
estimation sample. Panel A reproduces the main effects. In Panel B, we exclude
dispatches that involved any officer that did not participate in the experiment
randomization.2 The results are mostly unchanged although we see a stronger
1The result is however significant for the longitude outcome. The point coefficient is .002 of a
degree, which is approximate to 222 meters distance. Although statistically significant, in practice
the average difference in longitude is negligible.
2Some officers didn’t participated in the experiment because they were transferred to the
precinct after the randomization, or because they are originally from other precincts, or they are
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reduction in the filing of charges, and a smaller effect on reduction of use-of-force.
Panel C looks at dispatches with two officers, which is the modal dispatch size. The
results show that when we restrict the sample to these events, the effect on use-
of-force becomes statistically insignificant, even though it remains negative and
sizable in magnitude. The effects on the negative interaction index and on citizen
bad behavior remain strong. At last, Panel D excludes dispatches with more than 4
police officers and again the results remain virtually the same. Overall, our results
remain qualitatively unchanged in this exercise.
Finally, to support the career concerns hypothesis, we run a sequence of tests.
Our results from Table 2 Panel A show that the effects are only present when an
officer with soldier rank is holding the camera. Also, Table 1 Panel B shows the ef-
fects are primarily concentrated in ex-ante lower risk events. One could argue that
high-rank officers are called more to higher-risk events with a lower potential of
de-escalation of conflicts. In that case, our results wouldn’t be driven by career con-
cerns of younger officers, but rather the allocation of events to officers according
to their rank. In Appendix Table A6, we show that the presence of higher-ranked
officers in an event is not correlated with many of its characteristics. In partic-
ular, high-risk events are not correlated with the presence of a high-rank officer.
Neither is time-to-dispatch, the negative interaction index, and if the dispatch was
recorded or not. These suggest that the rank of the officers who attend to a given
event is uncorrelated with the event characteristics. Appendix Table A3 also sup-
ports the hypothesis that events with only soldiers and events with high-ranked
officers are similar in most margins, with the exception of recording the dispatch
and citizen bad behavior.
C BWC effects and the literature null
Experiments on the effects of BWC on use-of-force do not consistently show
that the cameras effectively work to decrease excessive use-of-force, and mixed
evidence across studies as shown by Lum et al. (2019). Appendix Table A7 lists
administrative or IT officers which are only allocated to dispatches occasionally. In fact, 84% of
events only have the involvement of officers that were part of the randomization roster.
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the main BWC papers in the literature.3 We include their main features, e.g. the
number of citations, country, sample size, share of treated units, and whether any
effect of use-of-force is detected. As it can be seen, the literature is not conclusive
on the BWC camera effects on use-of-force. We argue below that most papers were
plagued with methodological issues that attenuated the camera effects.
We start in Panel A with the studies that allocated cameras on the basis of
shifts. Those papers, whether providing experimental evidence or not, allocate
cameras to treatment and control shifts. We argue that this design is potentially
problematic as a single given officer may be allocated to both a treatment and
a control shift. This may be an important SUTVA assumption violation if, for
example, officers alter their behavior after using a camera, e.g. through learning,
or if there are across-officers spillover effects (Ariel et al., 2017). Out of the seven
studies that use shift analysis, five have use of force as an outcome and only one
finds statistically significant results (at the 5% level) that suggest that BWC affect
use-of-force. Ariel et al. (2015) conducted the first experiment on BWC and it is
by far the most cited paper in the literature. The shifts were randomized to be
conducted with and without cameras, and the results suggest that BWC reduce
use-of-force by the police. However, these effects are barely significant at the 10%
level. Following that, Ariel et al. (2016b) repeated the same design across multiple
sites, and the results show null effects of BWC on use-of-force. Ariel et al. (2016a)
suggest that one potential explanation for muted results comes from compliance
with the protocol. They show that use-of-force rates were higher in sites where
the compliance with the protocol was lower, and vice-versa. Magaloni (2019) does
not find any effects of BWC in use-of-force, and the experiment faced issues with
low compliance as well. With an experiment in the UK, Henstock and Ariel (2017)
used shift randomization and find that BWC were effective to reduce use-of-force,
in particular physical restraint and non-compliant handcuffing.
We move to officer-centric designs in Panel B. The literature shifted to officer-
level allocation to ensure officers are always in the same assigned group through-
out the duration of the experiment. This design also presents its challenges. First,
3This is not intended as a literature review, but selective and partial read on the studies that we
found to be most prominent in the literature.
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contamination is a substantial concern: among the officer-centric papers we could
identify, half had routinely more than one officer per dispatch, which can me-
chanically result in contamination between officers if both a treated and a control
officer are in the same dispatch. Moreover, all officer-level studies treat half of
the police officers, which results in a much higher share of treated events – if an
event is considered as treated if one or more cameras were present –, given that
most dispatches are tended by more than one police officer. In our data, simula-
tions show that treating half of the officers would imply on around 75% of treated
events (see Figure A2), implying in a considerably smaller control group and po-
tentially undermining power. A corroborating evidence from Braga et al. (2020),
who use officer-level randomization combined with spatial selection of districts,
indeed shows evidence of large contamination from treated officers to control of-
ficers. Finally, some papers included in the experiment officers that volunteered
to wear a BWC (Jennings et al., 2015; Ready and Young, 2015; White et al., 2017;
Headley et al., 2017; Braga et al., 2017, 2018). This can introduce self-selection
bias and compromise the identification of the effects. Taken together, these design
characteristics can result in muted estimated effects of BWC on police operations.
Finally, in Panel C we list papers that make use of spatially explicit empirical
designs. Out of 11 studies, only three look at use-of-force as an outcome and only
Kim (2021) find evidence of the impact of BWC. They use a different empirical
strategy and take advantage of the variation in the timing of the adoption across
US agencies to assess the effects of BWC on a national level. While this strategy
does not have to deal with the spillover that can occur between officers, it relies on
the strong identifying assumption that adoption timing is independent of agency
characteristics.
Overall, some papers in this panel do not follow rigorous program evaluation
techniques and some do not even perform statistical inference methods. Nonethe-
less, meta-analysis with the existing studies have found no statistically significant
effect of BWC on use-of-force, even though the point estimate is negative (Lum
et al., 2020; Williams Jr et al., 2021).
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This experiment and the existing literature The level of detail of our dataset and
the two-layer design of our experiment allow us to replicate shift and officer-centric
designs in our data. In fact, when we mimic the analysis of other papers our results
become closer to theirs as we show in Figure 2. This is suggestive evidence that the
muted effects of BWC on the use-of-force in the literature are likely due to issues
in the experimental setup, e.g. not accounting for contamination or undermined
power.
In Panel A of Figure 2, the point estimate displayed in red shows the 61.2%
percent reduction in use-of-force, which is computed from the nominal effect size
of Table 1, along with the 95% confidence interval.4 The event-level estimate is
also signaled with the red dashed horizontal line across all panels, for ease of
comparison with other designs.
We explore in Panel A how changing the randomization unit can affect the
BWC effect estimates. We start with replicating studies that randomize officers
into treatment and control. The outcome variable yid is the share of incidents that
the officer i used force during day d. We then explore the experimental variation in
officer allocation to the treatment and control groups in the following specification:




φoj(i) + εid. (3)
excluding blackout days so we solely rely on the between-officer variation. As in
our main specification, we include police precinct-by-week fixed effects (ηbw) along
with day-of-the-week fixed effects (τd). We also include fixed effects φoj(i) for each
of stratification bins. The disturbance εid is clustered at the police precinct-by-day
level. Treatedi = 1 is if the officer was assigned to wear a camera and we are
interested in the estimated βofficer. Even though this is not at the event level, this
specification aggregates the data at a somewhat granular level. Even so, we see
that the effect sizes are reduced from 61.2% to 33.3%. The attenuation of the results
is consistent with spillovers effects, since the analysis at the officer level does not
account for the fact that control officer will mechanically tend to dispatches with
4We normalize our coefficients in terms of percentage reductions relative to the baseline inci-
dence of use of force to render the estimates comparable across studies.
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treated officers.
The final estimate in Panel A explores the shift randomization. In this case, we
collapse the data at the day-by-precinct level, and we explore the randomization
between blackout and non-blackout days. This is close to the experimental design
of shift-centric papers because a day is approximately composed of two 12-hour
consecutive police shifts. In the following specification, the outcome variable ydb
is the share of events in which force was used at police precinct b during day d.
ydb = βprecinct-day × Treatedd + ηbw + τd + εdb. (4)
The fixed effects we control for are police precinct by week and day-of-the-week.
The error term εdb is clustered at the police precinct-by-week level. The effect sizes
calculated with this model are around 9.5%, a substantial attenuation from the
61.2% reduction in use-of-force that was originally estimated from the event-level
specification, and not significant statistically. This effect size is in fact comparable
with studies that originally make use of variation at the officer level. For example,
Ariel et al. (2016b) also uses data at the precinct-shift level and explores shift ran-
domization, and is within our confidence interval. Appendix Table A8 shows the
results estimated with our data present in Panel A – not only for use-of-force, but
also for all the main outcomes considered throughout this paper.
Panel B of Figure 2 explores how the results change when we vary the temporal
resolution of the data. Aggregation implies that you can control less for omitted
effects, which could be controlled for using more granular fixed effects (such as
day of the week for example). The first effect size is replicated from Equation
(3), the most granular result we consider with this unit of randomization. The
second model aggregates the data to officer-month level. In this case, the outcome
variable is the count of use-of-force incidents by police officer i during month m.
The estimates are obtained from the specification below:




φoj(i) + εim (5)
where officer is i and month m. We include police precinct-by-month and strat-
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ification bins fixed effects. εim is clustered at the police precinct-by-month level.
Although the effect size does not change considerably, the precision decreases and
the result becomes statistically insignificant, potentially because the coarser data
reduced the sample size, and do not allow for the inclusion of granular fixed-
effects as in Equation (3).
We can further aggregate the data for each officer and consider all the exper-
iment period. In this case, the outcome variable is the number of instances of
use-of-force by officer i during all the experimental period. This essentially only
explores the cross-sectional variation, and we refer to this estimate as the “pooled”
specification. The estimating equation is:




φoj(i) + εi (6)
where we include precinct and stratification bin fixed effects. The error term is
clustered at the officer level. The effect size from this equation is smaller in magni-
tude and also statistically insignificant. As a reference from the literature, Yokum
et al. (2019) also uses data at the officer level pooled during the experiment period.
The effect size they find for use-of-force is virtually zero, in both magnitude and
statistical significance. Our pooled result is comparable to theirs and, again, their
point estimates fall within our confidence intervals. In Appendix Table A9 shows
the regression results for all the outcomes, and confirm that the attenuation bias
occurs across all outcomes.
Panel C explores how the methods most commonly used by the literature –
difference-in-means and differences-in-differences (DiD) –, would affect the esti-
mates. The first follows the model just described in equation 6 and the DiD follows
a model such as:
yit = βdid × Treatedi × Postt + γi + εit (7)
where t indicates a three-month time period and Postt is equal to one in the period
post-implementation. We include police officer fixed effects and cluster the stan-
dard errors at this same level. Unlike the difference-in-means, our effect sizes
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using the difference-in-differences are statistically significant and expressive in
magnitude, even though the data is aggregated at such a coarse level. This can
indicate that the within-officer analysis, which considers baseline information for
each officer, might be effective to control for unobserved effects that can lower pre-
cision and introduce noise to the analysis. Again, we single out Braga et al. (2018)
as a paper with similar inference method. Their results are within our confidence
interval. In Appendix Table A10 we can see how changing the inference method
matters and the pattern is similar across most outcomes.
Overall, our results suggest that the mixed evidence existing in the previous lit-
erature on BWC and use-of-force is suggestive that the experimental design (and
the ensuing methodological challenges) can be a major reason for why muted ef-
fects of BWC were detected in previous work. This does not rule out that contex-
tual factors played a role in explaining the difference in the results; in fact, it was
expected that camera effects could substantially differ across study sites. Through
this analysis, we however do not observe any evidence to this effect. We instead
observe that mimicking in our data the research design in other papers estimates
similar effect sizes. We conclude that research designs are more likely to be the
main reason for differences in the policy evaluations across studies.
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Appendix Tables and Figures
Figure A1: State of Santa Catarina and the experimental sites where the BWC
intervention was implemented
Notes: The figure presents the experimental sites on which the experiment took place. These are the catchment areas of
the 24th Police Precinct in Biguaçu, 21st in Florianópolis, 14th in Jaraguá do Sul, 7th in São José and 5th in Tubarão.
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Figure A2: Induced treatment allocation at the event-level from officer-level
camera randomization
Notes: Figure displays simulation results that were used to identify the optimal share of treated officers to ensure 50% of
the dispatch events would be treated by virtue of having at least one camera attending the dispatch. The horizontal axis
captures the share of officers assigned to receive treatment while the vertical axis plots the share of events that are treated
by at least one camera at the dispatch. The vertical dashed line indicates the experimental design chosen whereby 1/3 of
the officers are assigned to wear a camera while 2/3 are control group officers that never wear a camera themselves.
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Figure A3 (cont): Spatial Distribution of Treatment and Control Dispatches
Tubarão
Notes: The figure presents kernel density estimates of the spatial distribution of treatment and control events across four
cities that were part of the experiment. It highlights that the spatial distribution of both treatment and control event
dispatches is very similar throughout and highlights the different topographies of the study area.
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Table A1: Summary Statistics of study sites
Biguaçu Florianópolis Jaraguá Do Sul São José Tubarão SC average
Panel A. Socioeconomic Characteristics
Population 58,206 421,240 143,123 209,804 97,235 18,468
(42,990)
Urban (%) 0.904 0.964 0.932 0.989 0.907 0.599
(0.231)
Income 1,208.22 2,578.28 1,586.99 1,692.74 1566.36 1,127.35
(236.72)
White (%) 0.836 0.846 0.864 0.844 0.908 0.829
(0.103)
Primary school or less (%) 0.292 0.623 0.594 0.574 0.656 0.571
(0.082)
High school or less (%) 0.797 0.959 0.941 0.937 0.965 0.940
(0.025)
Water access (%) 0.995 0.999 0.996 0.999 0.995 0.987
(0.023)
Computer (%) 0.490 0.727 0.585 0.661 0.569 0.365
(0.110)
Internet (%) 0.391 0.650 0.427 0.564 0.462 0.248
(0.101)
Panel B. Violence and use-of-force Incidence
use-of-force Incidents 23 52 34 62 22 -
Crime Events 739 2135 2622 3097 1309 -
Homicide Rate per 100k 22.9 17.16 5.38 16.9 9.65 -
use-of-force - Yearly Rate per 100k 106.90 33.39 64.27 79.95 61.21 -
Crime Events - Yearly Rate per 100k 3,435.05 1,371.276 4,956.55 3,993.78 3,642.28 -
Notes: Socio-demographic characteristics and baseline violence across the five study sites and the average in Santa Catarina state. So-
ciodemographic data from 2010 IBGE Census, Homicide Rate from the 2016 IPEA Atlas da Violência and use-of-force and Crime Events
Incidence from author’s calculations using PMSC data from March to July, 14th 2018. Income in Brazilian Reais per month. Standard
errors in parenthesis.
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Table A2: Endogenous Fact Reporting
Noise Verbal Robbery Assault Threat Domestic
Violence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treat 0.286 0.051 0.862* 0.695* 0.130 1.112***
(0.581) (0.496) (0.454) (0.389) (0.328) (0.284)
Mean DV Control 8.570 6.611 4.761 3.626 3.333 1.648
N 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. Unit of observation is a police event. All dependent variables are indicators
if a given criminal typology was reported at the end of the event and are multiplied by 100. Specifications include
police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of officers and stratification bins fixed effects. Shifts without
camera are excluded from the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct-by-day level. *** p<0.01; **
p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table A3: Dispatch Composition






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Rank
T x All Soldiers 26.193*** 2.834** 2.703*** -0.378** -0.500** -0.323* -0.272
(1.275) (1.178) (0.803) (0.157) (0.222) (0.166) (0.515)
T x At least 1 Above Soldier Rank 18.409*** 3.541** 2.799** -0.363 0.287 -0.669** -0.473
(1.466) (1.730) (1.193) (0.293) (0.347) (0.336) (0.936)
Coef. Difference 7.784*** -0.707 -0.097 -0.016 -0.786** 0.346 0.201
(1.623) (2.019) (1.451) (0.329) (0.415) (0.372) (1.058)
[0.0000] [0.3633] [0.4735] [0.4812] [0.0300] [0.1764] [0.4248]
Panel B. Any Previous Disciplinary Procedures
T x None 24.423*** 0.818 3.227*** -0.403** -0.465 -0.390** 0.339
(1.591) (1.592) (1.178) (0.181) (0.297) (0.176) (0.765)
T x At least 1 23.786*** 4.293*** 2.499*** -0.358* -0.185 -0.436** -0.566
(1.260) (1.221) (0.858) (0.196) (0.243) (0.216) (0.562)
Coef. Difference 0.637 -3.475** 0.728 -0.044 -0.280 0.046 0.905
(1.747) (1.920) (1.537) (0.270) (0.386) (0.279) (0.925)
[0.3579] [0.0363] [0.3184] [0.4348] [0.2344] [0.4352] [0.1647]
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 0.934 0.696 5.420
N 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. Unit of observation is a police event. Dependent variables defined as in Table 1 and heterogeneities are defined as in Table
2. Specifications include police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of officers and stratification bins fixed effects. Shifts without camera are excluded
from the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct-by-day level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table A4: Sample Robustness






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Main Specification
Treat 23.883*** 3.018*** 2.717*** -0.374*** -0.266 -0.426*** -0.338
(1.110) (1.014) (0.661) (0.142) (0.187) (0.156) (0.464)
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 0.934 0.696 5.420
N 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264
Panel B. Only Experimental Officers
Treat 24.522*** 3.583*** 2.489*** -0.318** -0.364* -0.303* -0.012
(1.148) (1.086) (0.734) (0.158) (0.204) (0.168) (0.489)
Mean DV Control 0.000 31.417 13.149 0.815 0.946 0.655 4.973
N 11,200 11,200 11,200 11,200 11,200 11,200 11,200
Panel C. Two Officers - Modal Dispatch Size
Treat 23.927*** 3.959*** 3.278*** -0.270** -0.374** -0.224 -0.149
(1.186) (1.118) (0.741) (0.126) (0.175) (0.140) (0.438)
Mean DV Control 0.000 30.643 13.205 0.595 0.812 0.417 3.795
N 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922 9,922
Panel D. At Most Four Officers
Treat 23.894*** 3.107*** 2.880*** -0.328** -0.288* -0.344** -0.451
(1.109) (1.025) (0.669) (0.129) (0.170) (0.141) (0.460)
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.389 13.612 0.750 0.858 0.597 5.146
N 12,541 12,541 12,541 12,541 12,541 12,541 12,541
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. Unit of observation is a police event. Dependent variables defined as in Table 1. Specifi-
cations include police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of officers and stratification bins fixed effects. Shifts without
camera are excluded from the regression. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct-by-day level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *
p<0.1.
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Treat -1.543 0.001 0.002***
(1.287) (0.000) (0.001)
Mean DV Control 10.579 -27.468 -48.787
N 13,264 13,264 13,264
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. Unit of observation is a police event.
Sample includes all events in the experimental period and excluded shifts
without cameras. Dependent variables are: (i) Time to Dispatch, which mea-
sures the length of the interval between communication and dispatch arrival
in minutes and (ii) Latitude and (iii) Longitude, both measured in degrees.
Specifications include police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of
officers and stratification bins fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at
the precinct-by-day level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Any High Rank Officer -0.264 5.995*** 3.402*** 0.137 -1.583 0.010
(1.425) (1.543) (1.250) (0.263) (1.364) (0.010)
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 10.579 0.103
N 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264 13,264
Notes: The table shows the correlation between the presence of a high-rank officer in an event and the reporting mar-
gins and event characteristics. Data and dependent variables as defined in Table 1, time to dispatch measures length
of the interval between communication and dispatch arrival in minutes and high-risk is the ex-ante risk assessment
indicator used in Table 1. Specifications include police precinct-by-week, day of the week, number of officers and
stratification bins fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the precinct-by-day level. *** p<0.01; ** p<0.05; *
p<0.1.
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Table A7: Characteristics of Notable BWC Studies in the Literature
Share of Avg # of
(Quasi) Unit of (quasi) Treated officers per Analyisis Time UoF as Effects Inference
Paper Year # Citations Country Experiment randomization N T C Units dispatch Unit period outcome? on UoF method
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Panel A: Shift centric studies
Ariel et al. (2015) 2014 633 US Yes Shift 988 489 499 0.495 1 Shift None Yes Decrease Poisson regression
Ariel et al. (2016a) 2016 178 US Yes Shift 4,915 2,447 2,468 0.498 - Shift None Yes Null Means test
Ariel et al. (2016b) 2016 221 US Yes Shift 4,915 2,447 2,468 0.498 - Shift None Yes Null Means test
Ariel et al. (2017) 2017 187 US Yes Shift 3,882 1,908 1,974 0.491 - Shift None No - Means test
Henstock and Ariel (2017) 2017 78 UK Yes Shift 430 215 215 0.500 1 Shift None Yes Decrease Odds-Ratio
Ariel et al. (2018) 2018 48 US Yes Shift 4,915 2,447 2,468 0.498 - Shift None No - Odds-Ratio
Magaloni (2019) 2019 - BR Yes Unit-shift 21,472 16,390 18,642 0.468 1+ Officer-shift Shift Yes Null OLS
Panel B: Officer centric studies
Jennings et al. (2015) 2015 243 US Yes* Officer 89 46 43 0.517 1+ Officer None Yes Decrease (check) % change
Ready and Young (2015) 2015 239 US Yes* Officer 3,698 50 50 0.500 1+ Contact report None No - HGLM
White et al. (2017) 2017 84 US Yes* Officer 298 82 67 0.550 - Officer Pre-post Yes Null DiD
Jennings et al. (2017) 2017 62 US Yes Officer 120 60 60 0.500 - Officer Pre-post Yes Decrease % change **
Headley et al. (2017) 2017 89 US Yes* Officer 103 26 25 0.510 - Officer Pre-post Yes Null % change
Braga et al. (2017) 2017 62 US Yes* Officer 832 218 198 0.524 1 Officer Pre-post Yes Decrease DiD
Braga et al. (2018) 2018 107 US Yes* Officer 832 218 198 0.524 1 Officer Pre-post Yes Decrease DiD
Peterson et al. (2018) 2018 - US Yes Officer 504 252 252 0.500 - Officer Pre-post Yes Null DiD
Wallace et al. (2018) 2018 64 US Yes Officer 228,220 82 67 0.550 1+ Call-officer Call No - DiD
Yokum et al. (2019) 2019 32 US Yes Officer 1,922 1,189 1,035 0.535 - Officer None Yes Null OLS between officer
Koslicki et al. (2020) 2020 10 US No - - - - - - Officer * Month - Yes Null Time series analysis
Braga et al. (2020) 2020 9 US Yes Officer + District 562 140 141 0.498 1 Officer Pre-post Yes Decrease DiD
Braga et al. (2020) 2020 - US Yes Officer + Precinct 7,778 1,991 1,898 0.512 - Officer Pre-post No - DiD
Panel C: Spatially explicit designs
Katz et al. (2014) 2014 170 US No Area 2 1 1 0.500 - Area None No - Means test
Grossmith et al. (2015) 2015 107 UK Yes Team 2,060 814 1246 0.395 1+ Officer None No - Means test
Morrow et al. (2016) 2016 104 US No Area 4 1 1 0.500 - Area Pre-post No - Means test **
Ariel (2016a) 2016 79 US No District 17,726 1 5 0.167 2 Street segment Pre-post No - Means test
Ariel (2016b) 2016 92 US No Area 924,457 1 5 0.167 - Call Pre-post Yes Null Odds-Ratio
Hedberg et al. (2017) 2017 160 US No - 44,380 22,660 22,720 0.499 1+ Incident None No - GLM
Mitchell et al. (2018) 2018 10 UY No Region 38 5 14 0.263 - Region Pre-post No - Means test
Owens and Finn (2018) 2017 32 UK Yes Team - 814 1,246 0.395 1+ - - No - -
Bennett et al. (2019) 2019 - US No Squad areas 2 1 1 0.500 - Squad * Week Week Yes Null Diff. in trends test
Stolzenberg et al. (2019) 2019 6 US No - 1 - - - - Monthly rates Monthly No - None **
Kim (2021) 2021 - US Yes Agencies 6,929 - - - - Agency * Month - Yes Decrease DiD
Notes: Table provides a non-exhaustive overview of some of the existing empirical literature on BWC. The overview does not claim to be comprehensive but has aimed to include all empirical studies evaluating BWCs
across a broad range of fields from criminology to economics. In case a randomization unit is indicated with * next to a Yes it means that the officers included are partially self-selected into the experiment implying
that caution needs to be put on detected effects as these could be quite specific LATE estimates. The table focuses on the respective randomization design, the outcome measurement approach, method of inference and
whether effects on use-of-force (UoF) have been identified. Inference methods chosen often do not follow more rigorous program evaluation techniques, and the studies that do not perform statistical inference have **.
Not in all cases was it possible to infer all required input and only two papers have replication data available.
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Table A8: Alternative designs - Varying randomization Unit






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Event level - Main specification
Treat 23.883*** 3.018*** 2.717*** -0.374*** -0.266 -0.426*** -0.338
(1.110) (1.014) (0.661) (0.142) (0.187) (0.156) (0.464)
Mean DV Control 0.000 32.815 13.844 0.845 0.934 0.696 5.420
N 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264 13264
Panel B. Officer-day level - Between Officer
Treat 0.128*** 0.007 0.010* -0.004*** -0.004* -0.005*** -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Mean DV Control 0.125 0.411 0.190 0.020 0.021 0.015 0.107
N 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763
Panel C. Precinct-day level - Between Shifts
Treated Shift 0.117*** -0.017 -0.018** -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.006
(0.011) (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006)
Mean DV Control Shift 0.023 0.354 0.173 0.009 0.010 0.063 0.061
N 489 489 489 489 489 489 489
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. Panel A replicates our main results of Table 1. Panel B delivers between officer estimates
with officer-day unit of observation. Sample removes shifts without cameras and the specification includes precinct-by-week, day
of the week and stratification bin fixed effects. Panel C shows the estimates of the between shift analysis, with precinct-day unit
of observation. Specification include precinct-by-week and day of the week fixed effects. In Panel B and C, all dependent variables
measure the share of events by officer/shift that had an occurrence of the outcomes as defined in Table 1. Standard errors are clustered
at the precinct-by-day level. * p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table A9: Alternative Designs - Varying Temporal Resolution






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Between Officer - Pooled
Treat 0.100*** 0.005 0.010 -0.003 -0.006* -0.002 -0.012
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010)
Mean DV Control 0.123 0.433 0.182 0.013 0.021 0.014 0.106
N 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Panel B. Between Officer - Month
Treat 0.116*** 0.009 0.007 -0.005* -0.007 -0.004 -0.014
(0.019) (0.016) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.011)
Mean DV Control 0.127 0.431 0.182 0.015 0.023 0.013 0.100
N 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350
Panel C. Between Officer - Day
Treat 0.128*** 0.007 0.010* -0.004*** -0.004* -0.005*** -0.007
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
Mean DV Control 0.125 0.411 0.190 0.020 0.021 0.015 0.107
N 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763 10,763
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. All estimates deliver between officer estimates including the experimental period only, exclud-
ing shifts without cameras. Unit of observation is at the police officer-shift level. All dependent variables measure the share of events
by unit of analysis that had an occurrence of the outcomes as defined in Table 1. Panel A pools the data from September to December,
2018 and estimates the ITT with stratification bin, precinct fixed effects. Panel B uses officer-month unit of observation and estimates
the ITT with stratification bin and precinct-month fixed effects. Panel C uses data at the officer-day level and includes precinct-week,
stratification bins and day of the week fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the officer, precinct-by-month, and precinct-by-day
level respectively. * p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1.
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Table A10: Alternative Designs - Varying Inference Method






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A. Difference in means
Treat 0.100*** 0.005 0.010 -0.003 -0.006* -0.002 -0.012
(0.014) (0.016) (0.012) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.010)
Mean DV Control 0.123 0.433 0.182 0.013 0.021 0.014 0.106
N 450 450 450 450 450 450 450
Panel B. Difference in Differences
Treat x Post 0.218*** 0.001 0.019** -0.003 -0.001 -0.006* -0.035***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.010) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008)
Mean DV Control 0.000 0.436 0.183 0.015 0.021 0.017 0.129
N 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
Notes: Intention-to-treat specifications. Unit of observation is at the police officer level. All dependent variables measure the
share of events by officer that had an occurrence of the outcomes as defined in Table 1. Panel A delivers between officer
estimates including only the experimental period and treated shifts, and estimating the ITT with stratification bin and precinct
fixed effects. Panel B delivers within officer estimates including the experimental period and three months before the experiment
(June to December, 2018) and estimating the ITT with officer fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the officer level. *
p<0.01; ** p<0.05; * p<0.1..
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